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CONSTRUCTING 'HEALTH', DEFINING 'CHOICE':
LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POSTPGD EMBRYO IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS
ESTAIR VAN WAGNER AND ROXANNE MYKITIUK
York University, Canada 1
JEFF NISKER
University of Western Ontario

ABSTRACT
Through Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, embryos created by IVF are selected for
transfer to a woman based on particular characterisations , including the presence of
genetic markers or a tissue match for a sibling. In this paper we examine the precise
language used in the recent policy and regulatory documents of four jurisdictions (the
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) that in any way characterises
the post-PGD embryo. We then explore the mutually constructed relationship between
how that embryo is characterised and the purposes for which PGD is applied, as
well as the types of uses to which the post-PGD embryo is ultimately relegated. As
our analysis indicates, based on the information provided through PGD, a number
of possible categorisations of the post-PGD embryo emerge depending both on the
outcome of PGD, and the initial intention behind the procedure.

I.INTRODUCTION

New technical possibilities, clinical considerations and research
purposes are influencing both how we look at the embryo and what
we look for.2 By convention, the term 'embryo' refers to the product
of fertilisation of a human oocyte by a human sperm usually up to
the first eight weeks of development. 3 Attempts have been made to
characterise the human embryo from scientific,4 medical,5 ethical,6
religious7 and social8 perspectives, and have frequently been influenced
by views, interests and objectives of particular communities. 9 As
observed in Australia, the legislative definition of 'human embryo' is
'a compromise between different views and resulted from the legal

imperative to have a defined point against which legal judgements
could be made' .10 Heightened interest in defining and characterising
the human embryo has resulted from the creation and manipulation
of embryos outside of women 's bodies for assisted reproduction
and, more recently, genetic testing.

12

Sub-definitions

11

of the word

'embryo', such as 'pre-embryo' emerged in relation to

in

vitro

fertilisation (IVF) and related genetic research .13 Research purposes,
involving embryos created for the above clinical purposes, may also
define characteristics of the human embryo. 14
The characterisation of human embryos is influenced by and
plays an important role in determining the possible uses and non-uses
of an embryo by women undergoing IVF, clinicians and scientists. 15
For example, there has been recent emphasis on selection of the
'best' or 'most suitable' embryo for implantation in order to have
the highest pregnancy rate without the risk of high order multiple
pregnancy 16 including professional practice guidelines recommending
single embryo transfer. 17 As assisted reproductive technology (ART)
extends to genetic testing through preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD), new characterisations of the embryo emerge based on the
genetic information available. 18 Through PGD, embryos created by
IVF are selected for transfer to the woman 19 based on the presence
of genetic markers .20 In addition, as new research opportunities arise,
such as stem cell research, human embryos may be characterised in
particular ways in order to promote research.21
In IVF laboratories prior to the advent of embryo cryopreservation, 22

microscopic determinations of embryo 'health' based on morphologic
criteria, including evidence of cell division, lack of fragmentation,
and blastomere symmetry and clarity, were undertaken in an attempt
to determine the 'best' three (or more) embryos to transfer to the
woman's uterus with the remaining embryos being discarded to avoid
high-order multiple pregnancy.

23

For the past 15 years, embryos not

transferred in the IVF 'treatment cycle' have been

cryopreserved

for later transfer to the woman so that she may avoid the harms
of menotropin drugs24 and oocyte retrieval surgeries25 inherent in
additional IVF cycles.26 Some IVF clinicians and scientists continue
to use microscopic criteria to determine which are the 'healthiestlooking' embryos in order to transfer the 'best' embryos while 'fresh'
as they believe this practice achieves the highest pregnancy rate.
However, no evidence exists that an embryo's potential to become
a child can be ruled out on morphologic characteristics as viewed
through a microscope, indeed there is evidence to the contrary. 27
The development and application of PGD provides another context
in which determinations of the 'best' or 'healthy' embryo are made
by providing access to a rapidly increasing number of gene markers .28
These biomedical determinations may be used to prevent perceived
'health' problems in prospective children, or to select characteristics
of a potential child.29 PGD was developed in the late 1980s30 as a
technology that would allow women/couples to be able to assess
particular markers of inherited conditions in embryos created through
IVF rather than in fetuses. By assessing IVF embryos for inherited

conditions, and transferring to the women only the embryos that do
not have the genetic marker, women/couples who are considering
preventing having a child who could develop a particular genetic
condition, would not have to consider the physically and emotionally
stressful alternatives of amniocentesis or chorionic villous sampling31
followed by genetic abortion almost half way through the pregnancy
(frequently after fetal movement has been felt).32
Embryos undergo PGD when they have divided to the

8-cell

stage (day 3 post-IVF) or the following day at the blastocyst stage.33
It is also possible to perform PGD on 'polar

bodies'

34

that

are

extruded from the eggs following the metaphase II division. When
an 8-cell embryo undergoes biopsy for genetic assessment, all cells
(blastomeres) are identical. One or two of these blastomeres can be
removed from the embryo, usually without decreasing the embryo's
ability to implant in the uterus.35 To remove a blastomere, a tiny hole
is made in the covering of the embryo (zona pellucida). This hole
was originally made with a dissolving solution,36 but now is usually
made through a laser incision. 37 The blastomere is then
from the embryo

through

gentle

suction.38 Chromosome

removed
number

and structure are assessed through fluorescent in situ hybridisation. 39
The DNA in the blastomeres is multiplied using polymerase chain
reaction.40 When looking for a genetic marker embryos from which
the blastomeres were removed may be transferred to the woman's
uterus, or cryopreserved to be transferred in later cycles.41
The focus of our exploration is on what we refer to as the 'post-

PGD embryo' - those embryos that have undergone testing through
PGD. We examine the precise language used in the recent policy and
regulatory documents of four jurisdictions (the United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand) that in any way characterises the
post-PGD

embryo.

We

then

explore

the

mutually constructed

relationship between how that

embryo

is

characterised and the

purposes for which PGD is applied, as well as the types of uses to
which the post-PGD embryo is ultimately relegated. As our analysis
indicates,

based

on

the

information

provided

through

PGD, a

number of possible categorisations of the post-PGD embryo emerge
depending both on the outcome of PGD, and the initial

intention

behind the procedure. 42 In the context of this examination we reveal
how understandings of 'health' are being produced through the clinical
practice and scientific application of PGD.

II.METHODS

Our research is based on the examination of documents from
relevant government departments and agencies, research bodies and
the policies and guidelines of various professional

bodies,

which

relate to the practice of PGD in the United Kingdom,43 Australia,44
Canada45 and New Zealand.46
The documents examined contemplate the regulation and control
of PGD as part of the governance of ART and the use of
human embryos. In the relevant legislation

of

the

in vitro

jurisdictions

examined here, PGD is generally referred to only in limited terms, 47
or not specifically referred to.48 We

contend that

the

documents

from regulatory and professional bodies examined here play

an

important, but under-examined, role in informing and shaping the
clinical practice and scientific applications of PGD in such legislative
regimes. Our examination of these documents will analyse the precise
language through which characterisations of the post-PGD embryo
occur. Further, we will explore how the resulting uses or non-use of
post-PGD embryos are intertwined with understandings of 'health'
emerging from the practice of PGD.

III. CATEGORISATION & ISSUES

Five overarching categories of characterisation

of post-PGD

embryos emerge from the analysis of the documents we examined :49
1) the affected embryo; 2) the unaffected embryo; 3) the sex-selected
embryo; 4) the HLA tissue-typed embryo; and 5) the carrier embryo.
Within each category issues related to assumptions behind the various
categorisations of the post-PGD embryo, who makes decisions about
categorisation, and what the implications of these processes

and

decisions are for women, people living with disabilities, practitioners,
scientists and society-at-large, are discussed.
There

are

important

differences

in

the

way

that

each

characterisation is constructed and determined in different jurisdictions
as will be noted in our discussion. As well, these characterisations

are not mutually exclusive, rather the post-PGD embryo may fall into
multiple categories at the same time, or shift from one to another
depending on its possible use or non-use.

1. The Unaffected Embryo

An embryo that has been tested using PGD for genetic markers
of a 'disease' or 'condition' and is free of these markers can be
characterised as an unaffected embryo. This theme emerged from the
documents in terms used to describe such an embryo, as 'healthy' ,50
'normal' ,51 'disease-free' ,52 'not known to have such an abnormality' ,53
'suitable' ,54 as well as 'unaffected' .55
The unaffected embryo is deemed to be 'suitable' for transfer
or implantation based on its status as being 'disease-free' ,56 'without
the genetic disorder' ,57 'free of the genetic disorder' ,58 'without a
specific serious genetic disorder or chromosomal

abnormality' ,59

not having 'a copy of the faulty gene' ,60 or that they 'do not carry
markers for the condition in question' ,61 are 'not known to have such
an abnormality' ,62 or 'do not have a particular gene mutation' .63
Only post-PGD 'embryos that are predicted to be unaffected' 64
are implanted in the woman, providing 'an opportunity to begin
a pregnancy knowing that only unaffected

embryos have been

transferred' .65 As recent policies in New Zealand,66 Australia,67 and
the UK68 proscribe 'the number of embryos transferred is kept to
a minimum' 69 including the possibility of a single-embryo transfer70

to avoid the problems associated with multiple pregnancy and the
'health' problems of the children born prematurely thereof.7 1 As with
all IVF embryos, post-PGD embryos that are 'no longer required' 72
for the reproductive purposes for which they were created, may be
described as 'remaining' ,73 'supernumerary' ,74 'spare' ,75 'surplus' 76 or
'excess' .77
The way embryos are classified under one of these terms
differs across jurisdictions as do the ways in which they can be used
for either reproductive or research purposes beyond the reproductive
needs of the woman or couple for whom they were created.

78

The

unaffected embryos that are 'remaining',79 could be 'destroyed',80
'stored for later use' ,81 'placed in storage' ,82 or 'used for research
purposes' ,83 as well as donated to 'another individual'

84

for

'reproductive purposes' .85
It is in this context that unaffected embryos are characterised, in
some documents, as 'healthy' 86 or 'normal' .87 While 'healthy' is not
used as a general descriptor of the unaffected embryo, it has been
used to refer to 'unaffected' embryos in discussions about the disposition of embryos that will not be used for reproductive purposes,
either because there are more unaffected embryos than are needed
for implantation, or because PGD is being used to select for a tis- suematch or against a carrier embryo. In these situations the ethical
dilemma is framed in regards to the disposal or use of unaffected
embryos deemed 'healthy' as a result of PGD. By implication the
disposal or use of affected post-PGD embryos is not seen to pose the

same ethical issues.
We contend that a characterisation of 'health' based on the
outcome of PGD is problematic as only specific and limited genetic
markers are identified, and therefore 'health' is understood as the
absence of these markers and the conditions they are associated with
in living persons. As the HGRP cautions, 'PGD is not a guarantee of
a healthy baby' .88

PGD is not a guarantee that any resulting pregnancy and child will

be perfect, or even healthy. The genetic testing can only find what is
looked for so, whilst a fetus may be free of the Tay-Sachs disease it
was screened for, it may be born with cystic fibrosis.89

The HFEA has pointed out, through the use of PGD
woman makes a

' ...the

decision about suitability based on information

about the genetic status of the embryo' ,90 and it is clear that genetics
is only one of many factors in the overall health of a child. In our
view, the characterisation of the post-PGD embryo based on 'health'
is further problematised by the implication of such

statements

that

while limited in its scope, PGD could ultimately determine the health
of an embryo. Moreover, no critical comment about what the word
'health' implies in relation to disabled persons is included in these
statements.91

2. The Affected Embryo

'The Affected Embryo' emerged as a characterisation of

post-

PGD embryos which have been determined to have markers for a
genetic condition and are described by terms such as: 'known to have
a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality' ,92 'affected'

93

or

those that have been found to have a genetic 'anomaly' ,94 'mutation' ,95
an 'abnormality' ,96 'a genetic disease',
'serious

genetic

defects',99

'genetic

97

a 'serious genetic disorder' ,98

abnormality

'serious genetic abnormality or a disease',

101

or

disease',

100

or 'genetic conditions

incompatible with life, or with a life of quality' .102
These post-PGD embryos are generally also characterised as
'unsuitable for implantation' ,103 'not suitable for implantation' ,104
'unsuitable for transfer',
'unfit',

107

105

'not suitable for reproductive use',

'unfit for transfer',

108

and 'not fit for implantation'.

Generally post-PGD embryos characterised in these

ways

106

109

have

been 'rejected', 110 'allowed to perish', 1 11 'stored', 112 'destroyed', 113
or 'discarded' .114 The HFE Bill requires that these embryos 'must
not be preferred'. 115 However, there is an emerging demand for such
embryos as a supply of 'fresh' embryos for 'research, training and
improvements in clinical practice' . 116 In the jurisdictions we examined
PGD is currently applied in cases of X-linked conditions, 'numerical
chromosomal abnormalities',

117

specific gene mutations or 'single-

gene defects'. 118
a. The Seriously Affected Post-PGD Embryo

The term 'serious' is invoked in a number of jurisdictions as a
threshold from which to distinguish between current and acceptable
applications of PGD and those characterised as 'trivial or [for] social
reasons' .119 Despite widespread reliance on the term, there is no agreed
upon definition of what 'serious' means in any of the jurisdictions we
examinedP0 The HGC has stated that, '[i]t has proved impossible to
define what 'serious' should mean in this context' .121
The HFEA's Code of Practice specifies that PGD will be available
'only where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic condition
being present in the embryo', 122 while the HGC recommends

that

PGD should be limited to 'specific and serious conditions' .123 The
HFE Bill introduced in the House of Lords in November 2007 would
amend the HFE Act to limit 'embryo testing' for 'gene chromosome
or mitochondrial abnormality' to cases where 'there is a significant
risk that a person with the abnormality will have or develop a serious
physical or mental disability, a serious illness or any other medical
condition' .124 Or in the case of identifying the sex of an embryo,
to 'serious' cases of 'gender-related physical or mental disability',
'illness', or 'medical condition' . 125 In their 2005 report on the use
of PGD for 'lower penetrance susceptibility conditions', the HFEA
suggested, '[h]ow serious a condition is depends on how having the
condition affects, threatens or limits the life of the individual'. 1 26
In their view, a condition that will not 'cause someone to suffer or
detrimentally affect their life' would be 'unlikely to be regarded as

serious', whereas a condition that requires 'regular invasive treatment,
or was life-limiting or life threatening' would be. 127 Following this
report the HFEA announced a policy approving the use of PGD for
BRCA 1 and 2, genes linked to breast cancer, and HNPCC genes
linked with colorectal cancer, 128 arguably opening PGD wider than
their previous practice of limiting the application to high penetrance 129
and early onset conditions. 130
The HFEA does not provide a definition of 'serious', leaving it
to 'discussion between the people seeking treatment and the clinical
team' 131 to determine. The Code of Practice

outlines factors to

be considered in determining when PGD is appropriate, including
consideration of the perspective of the woman, or couple, and

the

family situation, available support, as well as

the

specific condition in question.

132

the

nature of

Interestingly the original Draft Bill

would have amended the HFE Act to require the consideration of
five factors in determining whether embryo testing is 'necessary or
desirable', including the extent of impairment, the age
onset,

rate

of

degeneration,

the

proportion of

of

those

potential
with

the

'abnormality' who are 'affected', and the reliability of the test, 133
but excluding the perspectives of the woman and her partner or the
family circumstances.

134

However, this provision was not included in

the HFE Bill under consideration by the House of Lords in 2007.
In Health Canada's consultation document on the regulation of
PGD the use of PGD for 'medical/health reasons' is distinguished
from its use for 'non-health related traits such as hair or eye

colour'. 135 Health Canada cites the 'serious condition' standard as a
limitation on the use of PGD around which there is some agreement,
but acknowledges that it would be 'difficult to define' and that 'there
are many complex factors that need to be accounted for in this
definition'. 1 36
In New Zealand's PGD guidelines, one of the conditions for
the use of PGD in the case of 'familial

single

gene

disorders',

'familial sex-linked disorders' and 'familial chromosomal disorders'
is 'evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired as
a result of the disorder'.

137

The determination of seriousness is not

defined, but subsection six of the guidelines provides that '[i]t is
the responsibility of PGD providers, in collaboration with a clinical
geneticist, to determine whether a disorder is likely to be serious in
the offspring' .138 In this scenario the woman and her partner or family
are absent from the determination of 'seriousness'. The New Zealand
guidelines initially included the

wording 'high risk of a

serious

abnormality' rather than 'evidence that the future individual may be
seriously impaired' which appears in the final approved guidelines.

139

The HGRP report argues that this shift opens up the range of disorders
that might be considered to be included by providers, particularly
disorders of late onset in which there is only a risk that the condition
will present at some point in the future. 140
The 'seriousness' standard can be critiqued from a number
of perspectives . In the case of some conditions, '[a]lthough PGD
can confirm the presence of a genetic anomaly, it cannot predict

the extent to which the in vitro embryo, if transferred

into

the

womb and born alive, would be affected as a child or adult'.141
This becomes particularly problematic in the use of PGD for 'later
onset' disorders such as Alzheimer's or 'low penetrant' conditions. 142
Further, understandings of what constitutes 'suffering', what might
be considered 'detrimental effects', and when a condition is 'life
limiting' or 'threatening' are subjective and depend on a number of
factors in relation to both the individuals and family involved, as
well as the particular condition in question. 143 As the HFEA itself
suggests 'these factors may be difficult to predict before the affected
person is born'. 144
Evidence shows that 'people with genetic disorders, their families
and professionals have different views about which conditions give
rise to a poor quality of life. In general, those who have a direct
experience of living with a genetic disorder are likely to rate the
quality of their lives more highly than would medically qualified
professionals'. 145 As discussed below, the approach of the HFEA and
Western Australia to consider the perceptions of people seeking IVF
and PGD in determining 'seriousness' highlights the subjectivity of
such a determination . While the UK legislative review dismissed the
critics use of the word eugenics 'as an emotive term of abuse to
obscure rational debate', 146 concerns about who is defining what a
'serious' condition is, and on what basis, have not adequately been
addressed by policy or professional guidelines for PGD, particularly
in light of the shifting nature of 'seriousness'. Rather than confronting

the complexity of such determinations and their consequences, our
analysis reveals that the legal and policy approaches tend to privilege
'medical' or 'scientific' objective criteria, rather than more subjective
considerations , implying that 'seriousness' can somehow be defined
outside the context of people's lives and experiences.

b. Licensing, Power, and Reproductive Autonomy in the
Detection and Handling of the Affected Post-PGD Embryo

In 2005 the HFEA

altered

the

approval

process

licences such that once approval for a particular condition
clinic has been granted, other clinics with 'proven

for
in

expertise

PGD
one
in

performing embryo biopsies' will not have to go through the full
licensing process to be approved for the same condition, using the
same technique .147 Thus while there is no formal 'list' of approved
conditions, in practice particular applications of PGD will form an
'accepted list of conditions'. 148
In Australia, while research on human embryos is governed
nationally, the regulation of PGD falls under state jurisdiction. Many
states rely on the Commonwealth regulatory regime governed by
the NHMRC's Ethical Guidelines, which restrict PGD to conditions
that 'seriously harm' . 1 49 However, some States do have specific
legislation governing ART and PGD. In Western Australia

the

RTC advises that the 'seriousness of a genetic disease should be

considered in the broad context of the environmental and personal
factors of the participants' .150 Licence applications for PGD should
include the report of a 'clinical geneticist' in relation to a number of
factors including: the family 's 'experience with, and attitude to' the
condition; the 'level of impairment to body functions and structures
that is usually associated' with a condition; the difficulties expected in
'participating in activities such as learning and applying knowledge,
communication, mobility, self care, employment, community, social
and civic life; the 'level of support' required and the 'capacity of
the family' to provide it; and the 'prospects for new and longer term
treatments and interventions for the condition' .151
In Victoria the ITA's PGD policy uses the criteria

outlined

in

s.8(3) of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 that a 'genetic abnormality
or disease might be transmitted to a person born', but they do

not

provide a definition of a genetic disease or abnormality. 152 The policy
'entrusts' such a determination to 'the specialist with qualifications
in human genetics ', explicitly putting the physician in the role of
'gatekeeper' in relation to PGD.153 The Authority's 3-tiered approach
to the regulation of PGD includes a schedule of 'Approved Genetic
Testing' published in June 2006 which outlines the 'routine' uses
of PGD that do not require notification of application.

154

The ITA

also includes uses of PGD that 'require approval on a case by case
basis' such as sex-linked conditions where there is

'inconclusive

evidence about the transmission of that condition' including Autism
and Asperger's Syndrome.155 Conditions not covered by the schedule

would require 'prospective notification' to the authority. 156 Approval
in these situations requires fulfilment of the s. 8(3) criteria of a
'genetic abnormality or disease', based on the advice of a 'doctor
with specialist qualifications in genetics' .157
Access to PGD
medical profession',

in Canada
158

however,

'is currently

controlled

by

the

'there are no Canadian standards

or professional guidelines relating to the use of PGD in Canada' .159
Falling outside of formal regulation , decisions relating to PGD are
privately made by the women, or couple, with her doctor. 160
The HGRP points out that in New Zealand the professionals
involved with PGD have been given 'a broad mandate to determine
what constitutes a disorder that could cause serious impairment in a
future child, and the likelihood of it happening' .161 They distinguish
between the role of clinicians in the determination of the 'likelihood
of a disorder manifesting in prospective offspring' (which they see
as 'generally unproblematic'), and their role in determining 'what
constitutes a serious disorder'.

162

In their view, this determination

involves both 'objective considerations' such as the age at which
a disease would emerge or the potential of prevention and/or
therapy, and 'subjective considerations' such as the 'experience of
the prospective parents in relation to the condition '.163 The report
considers the possibility that 'by leaving such decisions in the hands
of treating clinicians, rather than in those seeking the procedure , PGD
cannot be represented as providing greater autonomy and reproductive
freedom' .164

Respect for reproductive autonomy is invoked as a justification
for placing determinations of 'seriousness ' in the private realm.

165

Leaving decisions about PGD to a 'discussion between the people
seeking treatment and the clinical team' is presented as a way to
balance 'respecting the views of those seeking PGD whilst preventing
the use of technology for purposes that are widely considered to be
unacceptable' .166 While we support the primacy of women's role in
determining what reproductive choices are best for herself and her
family, we caution that respect for reproductive autonomy should not
be invoked to allow policy makers and clinicians to avoid complex
and difficult questions about the potential impact of reproductive and
genetic technologies on understandings of 'health' and 'normalcy'.
Questions about how the use of technologies like PGD

will

broad social norms about family and being human

or how ' ...

167

affect

reproductive choices are being made against a background

of

inadequate social support for, and widespread discrimination against,
disabled people and people with genetic disorders'

168

should not be

sidestepped or kept behind the closed doors of the clinic.

c. Relationship of PGD and Traditional Prenatal Diagnosis

Until the new Code of Practice was released in 2007

169

the

HFEA maintained that the 'indications for the use of PGD should be
consistent with (though not necessarily the same as) current practice

in the use of prenatal diagnosis',

170

while the Royal College of

Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, in their response to the review of
the HFE Act, 171 stated that the conditions for which PND is allowed
should be the 'minimum' for which PGD can be applied. Such a
regulatory approach would have mirrored that in place for PND with
a similar approach of 'general guidance' rather than 'a list of specific
conditions' .172 While the current Code of Practice no longer considers
the relationship between PGD and PND, it is nonetheless revealing
to examine how it has been presented in the development of PGD
policy.
It is often argued that PGD is a preferable practice to PND
for at least two reasons : it is less traumatic for the woman because
of the avoidance of termination of a pregnancy 173 and it facilitates
a moral distinction that is made between 'an unimplanted embryo
and a fetus in an established pregnancy', which serves to justify the
application of PGD in situations where termination would rarely
be considered.

174

However, a number of concerns follow from this

hierarchical ordering of the in vitro embryo in relation to the fetus
and of PGD versus PND. For example, what effect might the imputed
moral distinction between the in vitro embryo and the in utero fetus
have on attitudes to abortion and women's reproductive autonomy?
Arguably, it could become less socially acceptable for women to seek
abortions following PND in light of an ethical preference for the use
of PGD - a practice that is both expensive and invasive.
An additional consequence of regarding PGD as more ethically

acceptable than PND entails a shift away from characterising the
purpose of screening and diagnosis as the provision of information
for potential parents through which they can decide to terminate
a pregnancy, or prepare for the birth of a child with a particular
condition.

175

The HGC contends, in relation to PND, that '[c]urrent

clinical best practice rejects the notion that women will necessarily
end a pregnancy after the identification of a fetal abnormality' . In
the case of PGD there is no pretence that given a positive diagnosis
the woman could or would choose to have a child with a genetic
condition, in fact in some jurisdictions such as Victoria and New
Zealand, this would be prohibited.

176

In Australia, embryos identified

as affected by PGD are now defined under s.7(1) of the RIHE Act
as 'unsuitable for implantation' by law as a result of the recent
amendments in the Patterson Act.177 It is important to consider what
effect this subtle shift towards a presumption of selecting out genetic
conditions may have on our attitudes to people living with them, and
also towards parents who choose not to use PGD or PND to select
out genetic conditions.

178

Already people with disabilities and their

families experience high levels of discrimination and a lack of social
support. 179 Will the expansion of PGD, in which de-selection of such
conditions is presumed and normalised, exacerbate the exclusion and
inequality faced by people with disabilities?

d. Disposition of the Affected Post-PGD Embryo to Research
Purposes

As illustrated above, the 'affected' post-PGD embryo is generally
considered to be incompatible with reproduction. Characterised as
'unsuitable'
'discarded',

180

182

or 'unfit',

181

the affected embryo is assumed to be

'allowed to perish',

result in their 'disposal',

184

183

or undergo other steps that will

or 'destruction' .185 The 2005 legislative

review in Australia found that due to the cryopreservation requirements
for the donation of 'excess' embryos, 'embryos that are not suitable
for implantation for any reason, including embryos that are found to
have a genetic disease using preimplantation genetic diagnosis, are
allowed to die and are not available for research' .186 Our analysis
reveals that the characterisation and disposition of the post-PGD
affected embryo are shifting, and we suggest

that

this

driven,

at

least in part, by the demand for embryos for research and training
purposes. 187
Following the 2005 legislative

review,

debates

in

Australia

suggest that designation as an affected embryo may signal a shift
in an embryo's potential purpose and/or value. On the one hand, the
value of the affected embryo for reproductive purposes is diminished,
since it is assumed that the intention of undergoing the diagnostic
procedure is to avoid transfer of an embryo affected by the genetic
condition for which it is being tested .188 However, on the other hand,
the affected embryo becomes potentially valuable for research and

training purposes.

189

Indeed, in a recent

consultation

on

embryo

research in New Zealand, the ACART singled out post-PGD embryos
as a specific source of surplus embryos for research purposes. 190
ACART proposes the use of post-PGD embryos for research
purposes since 'they may never be transferred to a woman's uterus' .191
Likewise the question of whether the

post-PGD

affected

embryo

should be considered to be available for research and training based
on the presumption that it would

otherwise be 'discarded"

92

was

prominently discussed in the 2005 Australian legislative review and
has since been the subject of major amendments to the RIHE Act
through the Patterson Act which came into force in 2007. A number
of submissions made during the review pointed to the lack of clarity
in the RIHE Act regarding the status of post-PGD affected embryos
deemed to be

'unsuitable for implantation' . 1 93 It was argued by a

number of parties

194

that post-PGD affected embryos should not be

characterised as 'excess' embryos and thereby subject to the same
consent and donation process outlined in the 'ART Guidelines' that
applies to those embryos created by IVF, but no longer required for
reproduction.

195

Avoiding their characterisation as

'excess',

would

free up post-PGD affected embryos to be used as a source of 'fresh'
embryos for research and training purposes. 196
Researchers and professional bodies who made submissions to
the Australian Legislative Review Committee consistently
that 'fresh embryos' were
that

'abnormally

'required', 197 would

fertilised'

and

'unsuitable'

be

suggested

'useful' 198 and

embryos

'should

be made available for research and
Committee recommended that

post-PGD

training' . 199 The
embryos

Review

'diagnosed ...as

being unsuitable for implantation should be permitted to

be

used

under licence for research, training and improvements in clinical
practice' .200 The recommendation was expressly aimed at addressing
the problems with availability of 'fresh'201 embryos due to the 14-day
'cooling-off '202 period that applies to donations of 'excess' embryos
resulting from IVF to research,203 effectively requiring that donated
embryos be frozen and stored before they are available for research.
The Committee specifically relied on the assumption that affected
embryos would 'normally be discarded', 204 as they

are unsuitable

for reproductive purposes, and therefore should not be subject to the
"proper consent" procedures:
It appeared to the Committee that the RIHE Act is not clear

on

whether such embryos could ever be considered to be 'excess ART
embryos' (because they are not suitable for reproductive

use in the

first place), and therefore whether they could ever lawfully be used
for research purposes (even if they are first frozen) ...In the view of
these ambiguities in the Act, as well as the potential use of embryos
that are not suitable for implantation in research, training, and quality
assurance activities, the

Committee considers that there should

be

clear and unambiguous provisions within the legislation and licensing
arrangements for declaring embryos that are unsuitable for implantation
as 'surplus embryos', and that such embryos should be permitted to be
used for research, training, and improvements in clinical practice.205

It is significant that this debate emerged in Australia where the
creation of human embryos for research purposes was prohibited under
the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 206 until the recent amendments
lifting the ban on cloning by allowing for the creation of a human
embryo clone but not the 'placing of a human embryo clone in the
human body or the body of an animal'.207
As the case of Australia reveals, the demand for embryos for
research, particularly fresh embryos, may put a strain on regulatory
measures restricting access to embryos created through IVF that are
not used for reproductive purposes . Recent developments in Canada
and New Zealand reveal similar

debates

about

access

to

'fresh'

embryos, and post-PGD embryos in particular. Interestingly a similar
debate has not emerged in the United Kingdom where the creation of
in vitro embryos for research has been legal under licence pursuant
to s.3(1) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,208 although
the 'question of what can or should be done with those considered
spare or unsuitable for implantation' was acknowledged in the most
recent legislative review in 2005 as a 'major stumbling

block

for

some individuals and groups'.209
In Canada, with the exception of the creation of a small number
of in vitro embryos for improving or providing instructions in assisted
human reproduction procedures, only embryos no longer required for
reproduction, will become available for research purposes, through noncommercial donation with written consent to their use.210 Until recently
donation of fresh embryos to research was not generally offered to

women undergoing IVF, and although not technically illegal, had not
been approved by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR).211
However,

recent

changes

to the

CIHR

Guidelines for

Human

Pluripotent Stem Cell Research, 212 which govern embryo donation to
research under s.40(3.1) of the AHR Act, explicitly allow for fresh
embryo donation, approving both embryonic stem cell lines and other
pluripotent cell lines from human embryos where:
1. The embryos used, whether fresh or frozen, were originally created
for reproductive purposes and are no longer required for such
purposes ;
and
2. There was free and informed consent from the persons for whom
the embryos were originally created for reproductive purposes ...;
and
3. Neither the ova nor sperm from which the embryos were created,
nor the embryos themselves were obtained through commercial
transactions ...213

We suggest that there has been a recent shift to allow for the use of
'fresh' embryos in stem cell research, in response to the demands of
stem cell researchers.
While there has not yet been an

explicit

distinction

drawn

between the use of affected versus unaffected embryos in Canadian
law or policy regarding embryo donation, the changes to the CIHR
guidelines have inspired some debate about the need to distinguish

between 'healthy' and 'unsuitable' embryos

for

the

purposes

of

donation to research . Notably in a recent presentation to the Senate
Standing Committee on Social Affairs ,

Science

and

Technology,

Dr. Fran\:ois Baylis advocated for revisions to proposed consent
regulations pursuant to the AHR Act to permit embryo research only
on frozen embryos and 'fresh embryos 'unsuitable for transfer' (for
morphological, biological, or genetic reasons)' .214 While the Standing
Committee did

not

adopt

Baylis's recommendations, they

recommend a 'more in-depth review' of 'the research use of

did
fresh,

viable, embryos' and included her submissions in their report.215
ACART's consultation document regarding embryo research in
New Zealand reports that '[w]hereas formerly all the surplus embryos
were frozen, they are now allowed to develop further and only the
viable embryos are now frozen' .216 It is unclear whether this would
exclude post-PGD affected embryos from being frozen, as 'non-viable'
embryos are defined by ACART as those without 'the potential to
develop into a foetus because of arrested growth, defects within the
blastomeres, or poor morphology' and in which 'analysis of the genetic
component ...reveals abnormalities in the chromosomes' .217 However,
given that post-PGD affected embryos 'may never be transferred to
a woman's uterus' 218 it is not clear that they would be frozen along
with unaffected surplus embryos for future use. ACART's document
suggests that the results of PGD will increasingly determine the types
of use deemed appropriate for post-PGD embryos in New Zealand in
light of their explicit consideration as a source for research embryos.

According to the consultation docu ment, embryos that would otherwise
be considered 'viable', given their potential to develop into a foetus,
might be excluded from consideration for reproductive use in New
Zealand based on their genetic characteristics.
While there are clearly important reasons to be concerned about
the donation of fresh embryos to research in relation to the future
reproductive interests of the women undergoing IVF treatment, 219 our
analysis reveals that there are equally important concerns about how
and by whom determinations of 'suitability' are made in the context
of embryo donations to research . Without a public and transparent
debate about how, and by whom, concepts like 'unsuitable' will be
defined - one which accounts for the perspectives of people living
with genetic conditions and their families - we must be careful not
to uncritically adopt genetic technologies such as PGD as sources of
objective determinations of health or normalcy and reproductive use.
The use of post-PGD embryos as a source of 'fresh' embryos
raises concern about the potential for the need for research embryos
to influence the type of determinations made by those practicing PGD.
Increased comfort with this production of embryos through IVF for
non-reproductive purposes may help to justify the expansion of PGD's
application and raises the possibility that standards regarding what is
considered a 'suitable' or 'unaffected' embryo may become narrower
in the interests of ensuring a supply of fresh embryos for research.
In tum, this could further shift our understanding of what kinds of

conditions are compatible, or incompatible, with reproduction and

health.
Despite ongoing debate about the implications of using PGD
to select against embryos

with

inherited

genetic conditions,

and

the lack of transparency in decision-making about the conditions
for which PGD should be available, the presumption in favour of
selection against genetic conditions is found throughout the literature
we examined:

...there are some situations in which it is known

that embryos

never be used for reproductive purposes; for

example,

will

embryos

identified by preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to be carrying
genetic diseases, and embryos where other abnormalities are identified.
These embryos would normally be discarded.220

Distinctions are being made between embryos to be used for
reproduction and affected embryos based on problematic assumptions
about the use and purposes

of reproductive

technologies.

The

submissions of Professor Agnes Bankier of Genetic Health Services
Victoria clearly demonstrate how clinicians and researchers presuppose
that 'couples would not go through PGD u nless they wanted to avoid
having a child with the genetic disease'.221 The

assumption that

'reproductive use' inherently means the use of an embryo free of a
particular genetic condition or abnormality subtly shifts the meaning
of reproductive use, such that it necessarily excludes the conditions
for which PGD is licensed and utilised. However, it is the process of

PGD itself, and the subsequent characterisations and determinations
of clinicians about the presence of particular genetic markers or
abnormalities in the post-PGD embryo which produce this lack of
suitability or fitness in the embryo; and, in doing so it redefines
reproduction to exclude the affected embryo.

e. Legislating Suitability: The Unsuitable Post-PGD Embryo in
Law

Australia's Patterson Act222 amends the RIHE Act to authorise
modifications of 'proper consent' for licenses for the use of 'unsuitable'
embryos. The Act now defines 'unsuitable for implantation, in relation
to a human embryo' in the following way:

(a) is diagnosed by preimplantation genetic diagnosis as unsuitable
for implantation, in accordance with the Ethical Guidelines on
the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice
and Research (2004), issued by the CEO of the NHMRC; or
(b) is determined to be unsuitable for implantation in the body
of a woman, in accordance with objective criteria specified in
guidelines issued by the CEO of the NHMRC under the National
Health and Medical Research Council Act 1992 and prescribed
by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph. 223

The amendment responds directly to the Lockhart REVIEW'S
recommendations that the unsuitability of ART embryos be determined
according to 'objective criteria', and through the use of PGD to detect
'serious genetic defects' .224 The REVIEW contrasted the objective
determinations of PGD to the subjectivity of determining 'when the
embryo appears less healthy' ,225 and the amended RIHE Act

now

legally sanctions PGD as one objective means of determining the
suitable from the unsuitable, based on genetic information.
Implicit in the Lockhart recommendations, and now

in

the

amended law, is an understanding of 'health' as the absence of
the particular genetic mutations identified by PGD. This implicit
assumption about the relationship between 'health' and the absence
of particular genetic mutations allows the Review to avoid
about the limitations of genetic

determinations

of

debates

health,226 as

well as concerns about the implications of PGD for people living
with disabilities.227 By positioning PGD as an 'objective' means
of determining 'suitability' the Review failed to acknowledge the
subjective factors involved in clinical decisions about when PGD
should be applied, and for what purposes. The Review relied on
the fact that these embryos would 'never'

228

have been used for

reproductive purposes to justify this kind of use. We suggest that
given the problematic

nature of determinations about 'seriousness',

'health' or 'quality of life' in relation to genetic conditions, it is
the application of PGD itself which produces the inevitability that
embryos with particular genetic conditions will not be transferred

to the woman, not the inherent or biomedical incompatibility of
particular genetic mutations with reproduction. Under Australia's new
law the practice of ART professionals in administering PGD becomes
the source of an 'objective'

229

determination of suitability, and their

determinations become the means through which 'fresh' embryos are
made available for 'research, training and improvements in clinical
practice'.

230

Section 24 of the RIHE Act, which sets out the
licensing conditions for the use of excess ART embryos, now
specifies that:

(a) a licence may provide that that guidelines referred to in the
definition of proper consent apply in a modified form in relation
to the use, under the licence, of excess ART embryos that
are unsuitable for implantation; and
(b) if a licence so provides, the guidelines as modified by the licence
have effect in relation to the giving of consent for such creation
or use.231

While the amendment does not specifically implement the'
removal of the cooling-off period for post-PGD affected embryos as
recommended by Lockhart and accepted by the Senate Committee, 232
it includes the following note: '[f]or example, the guidelines could
apply to a particular licence in a modified form, to alter the coolingoff period required in relation to the use of excess ART embryos that

are unsuitable for implantation' .233
The Lockhart Review gave considerable weight to the arguments
that undesirable constraints have been put on ART research and
training under the current legislative scheme: 'It is clear that areas of
ART research have been impeded or stopped altogether' and that '...
the licensing requirements place a significant barrier on training and
quality assurance activities, further limiting the progress and quality of
developments in ART' .234 The Committee expressed 'concem' 235 about
this 'apparently unintended consequence of impeding valuable research
and clinical practice in ART clinics'

236

and

their

recommendations

about the use of post-PGD affected embryos are a direct response. 237
In their statement of support for the Lockhart recommendations, the
Senate Committee cited Australia's 'leading role in biotechnology' 238
implying that any legislative changes should ensure this leadership
continues. Attention to these kinds of concerns are also indicated by
amendments to s.47(4) of the RIHE Act, which require that review of
the Act will now 'take into account' a number of additional factors
including 'an analysis of any research or clinical practice which has
been prevented as a result of legislative restrictions' .239

f. The Positively Affected Post-PGD Embryo

Women may choose to undergo PGD in order to have a child
with particular characteristics that others might view as a disability

and thus not in the best interest of the future child's well-being. 240
This is frequently termed 'positive selection'.241 The most often cited
potential example is selection of a gene for deafness, based on a
US case in which a deaf lesbian couple intentionally chose a deaf
sperm donor with an extensive family history of deafness in order
to produce a child who was also deaf.242 The couple maintained that
they considered deafness to be a culture, not a disability, challenging
those who would characterise the decision as harmful or not in the
child's best interests,243 as well as supporting arguments against
accepting concepts of 'health', 'disease' and

'normalcy'

without

critical appraisal.244
This reasoning complicates dichotomous categories assumed to
be natural and mutually exclusive such as 'medical' and 'social',
and in the case of PGD, acceptable and unacceptable. 245 Disability
rights perspectives contend that disability is a socially and politically
constructed concept, not a self-evident medical category.246 While
the STC in the UK contends that '[w]e should use the current
impracticality of screening for desirable social characteristics to
engage in a rational debate on the subject' ,247 a disability rights
perspective would suggest that current PGD practices of selectingout genetic conditions is doing precisely this kind of screening.248
The STC's report also refers to the example of selection in favour of
fertile achondroplastic dwarfism, 249 finding that support for such uses
of PGD are justified by the need to respect reproductive autonomy
and popular discomfort would not justify state intervention:

We can imagine that many clinicians would baulk a the idea of
selecting, for example, a deaf child using PGD but we do not feel
that the creation of a child with reduced life opportunities is sufficient
grounds for regulatory intervention, else we might logically deny poor
people IVF.250

However, the STC's position is premised on a characterisation
of deafness and dwarfism offered by Dr Professor Tom Shakespeare
in his submissions to the committee as 'minor or trivial conditions',
where the child would suffer 'disadvantage' rather than 'discomfort' .251
They maintain such decisions would be 'more challenging' in the
case of 'obvious discomfort' ,252 but fail to explore this further and
engage with critical perspectives on disability which point out that
there is no clear line between what is trivial or serious.253
In the UK and Canada, the legal status of this kind of genetic
selection is not certain;254 however, other jurisdictions have expressly
prohibited selection for 'a genetic impairment seen in a parent' 255
in the case of New Zealand, or 'in favour of genetic disease or
abnormality'

256

in Victoria. Australia's NHMRC Ethical Guidelines

restrict this use of PGD '[p]ending further community discussions' .257
If passed, the UK's HFE Bill will amend the HFE

Act

to

ban

positive selection of an embryo 'known to have a gene, chromosome
or mitochondrion abnormality involving

a

significant risk that a

person with the abnormality will have or develop a serious physical
or mental disability, a serious illness or any other serious medical

condition' where there are embryos without the abnormality available
for transfer.258 Interestingly the Bill will also prohibit selection of
an embryo or gamete donor with a specific condition, effectively
outlawing positive selection through the use of ART even outside of
the application of PGD.259 The explanatory notes of the original Draft
Bill, from which the HFE Bill was developed, specifically reference
the 'positive selection of deaf donors in order deliberately to result
in a deaf child' as being prevented by the proposed law.260
As Canada's Brave New World report considers there may be
significant human rights issues raised by these kinds of provisions
in regards to both the individual liberty and equality aspects of
reproductive choices.261 Such a prohibition is also inconsistent with
the fact that we would not stop someone with a genetic condition
from having children without ART procedures in order to prevent the
condition from being inherited. Further, as the HGRP PGD report
considers, the New Zealand prohibition 'may in fact limit some
reproductive choices', using the example of a couple who undergo
PGD for one condition with a limited number of eggs, and find that
all the embryos are 'affected with the disorder being screened for' .262
They suggest that the Guidelines would preclude the couple from
choosing an 'affected' embryo 'in the hope that the expressivity of
the disorder in the resulting child will be only mild' .263
4. The Sex-Selected Embryo

When PGD is used to test for sex-linked

'disorders', the

determination as to suitability will be based on the sex of

the

embryo,264 and only post-PGD embryos 'not of the affected sex' are
transferred to the woman. 265 However, selecting for sex where there
is no serious medical reason for doing so is prohibited in several
jurisdictions.

266

PGD can be used to identify the sex of an embryo.267 As noted in
documents from all countries,268 in the case of sex-linked 'disorders',
sex selection through PGD is used to avoid the implantation of
embryos of the sex that is likely to exhibit a particular genetic
condition in a child.269 While this type of sex selection, referred to
as sex selection for medical purposes, 'has become widely accepted
as a legitimate route' 270 many of the issues discussed above regarding
selecting against
characteristics'

272

particular genetic

conditions271 or 'undesirable

are also applicable to the sex-selected embryo.

However, additional considerations arise when PGD is used to
determine the sex of an embryo for 'social'

273

or 'non-medical'

274

reasons, which include 'family balancing', 'rebuilding a family after
the death of a child with another of the same sex', or 'to fulfil a
general preference for children of one sex over another'.275 Indeed,
sex-selection for 'social' reasons is one of the most contentious
aspects of the debate surrounding PGD, as the 'simple genetic basis'
of sex makes it currently available unlike other forms of 'social'
selection and 'designer babies', which are commonly dismissed as
'unrealistic'.276
In the majority of jurisdictions

examined, non-medical

sex

selection is expressly prohibited in either legislation, or through
professional

guidelines referring

to PGD. New Zealand's

PGD

Guidelines expressly prohibit the use of PGD for 'social reasons including sex selection' .277 Canada's AHR Act makes it an offence to
'identify' the sex of an embryo except to avoid a sex-linked disorder.278
In the Brave New World report it was suggested that challenges
to this prohibition on the basis of the 'legal doctrine of informed
consent with respect to medical treatment' may not be successful as
'[t]he state could likely establish that such a prohibition or regulation
is rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose' .279 As
well, the report suggested that while in Canada information related to
genetic disease in an in vitro embryo may be 'categorised as central
to a person's decision regarding reproduction', knowledge related to
the sex of the embryo may be seen as more of a 'lifestyle choice' .280
In Australia, the NHMRC Guidelines prohibit 'selection of the sex
of an embryo except to reduce the risk of transmission of a serious
genetic condition' pending further discussions.281 The Victoria ITA's
policy lists 'the use of sex-selection except to reduce the risk that
the child will be affected by a genetic abnormality or a disease' 282
as prohibited under the IT Act.283 The Western Australian RTC also
states the 'use of an embryo diagnostic procedure

for sex selection

alone is not permitted' .284
The UK's HFE Act does not expressly prohibit sex selection
for non-medical reasons, however, the HFEA's restriction of PGD
to 'serious genetic conditions' has, in the past, effectively

ruled

this

out.285 Recently, the STC Committee's Report reveals that there is
pressure to open up the use of PGD for social sex selection. While
the report notes objections based on demographic, international and
psychosocial implications, as well as ethical considerations and sex
discrimination, they conclude that '[t]he onus should be on those who
oppose sex selection for social reasons using PGD to show harm from
its use ...On balance we find no adequate justification for prohibiting
the use of sex selection for family balancing' .286 The report states
that evidence of 'harms to individuals of society' does not counter
balance a restriction on 'reproductive freedom' in the case of sexselection for family balancing. 287 In contrast the Ethics Committee
of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG)
suggested that 'the evidential burden' should be 'the responsibility of
those advocating the introduction of PGD to show that it does not lead
to unfair discrimination' .288 In their response to the STC's report, the
UK Government declined to adopt the Committee's recommendation
stating that '[t]he Government has no plans to alter this position to
allow sex selection other than for compelling medical reasons' .289
Indeed, the HFE Bill would continue to prohibit non-medical sexselection, and amendments to the embryo testing provisions could
not authorise such a practice. 290
While the STC's position is consistent with their own definition
of the 'precautionary principle' - 'that alleged harms to society or to
patients need to be demonstrated before forward progress is unduly
impeded',291 the Government's response to the STC contests '...the

Committee's interpretation of

the precautionary principle', arguing

that '[t]he potential harms that should be taken into account may
not necessarily be susceptible to demonstration and

evidence

in

advance' .292 The weight given to public concerns and critiques about
the use of PGD for non-medical/social sex selection293 may offer
valuable lessons for those seeking to critique genetic diagnosis in
relation to disability. Fears about eugenics and 'designer babies' are
characterised in many of the documents we examined as irrational or
emotive:
If ensuring that your child is less likely to face a debilitating disease

in the course of their life can be termed eugenics, we have no problem
with its use. State programs that impose a genetic blueprint are another
matter. They should be outlawed as part of any regulation of assisted
reproduction . Use of the word eugenics must not be used as an emotive
term of abuse to obscure rational debate.294

The HGRP states that, '[i]t may be the case that most fears of
eugenics are unfounded, based as they are on unrealistic expectations
of what can be achieved through genetic technology' .295 And the
Human Genetics Commission in the UK cites 'practical limitations'
to show that '[t]he anxiety that PGD lies at the top of a slippery slope
leading to the possibility of a wide range of potential enhancements,
such as intelligence or beauty is misplaced' .296
However, disability rights critiques make it clear that selection
on the basis of genetic markers or conditions is not necessarily any
less 'social' than selection for athletic ability or hair colour.297 Socially

constructed norms about intelligence and beauty are as much a part
of our acceptance of selection out of genetic conditions as are those
rooted in medical realities. As the RCOG points out in their position
on sex selection: 'If sex is allowed as a sole criterion, then selection
for other characteristics (e.g. intelligence, beauty, sporting prowes s
etc) would be permissible should the techniques for doing so become
available'. 298 Their position acknowledges the inconsistency between
the position that 'it is ethical to use PGD to discriminate against one
sort of condition (disability)' but not 'against another condition (i.e.
sex)' .299 This inconsistency clearly demonstrate s the need to examine
assumptions about the inherent objectivity of 'medical' selection,
particularly as the uses of PGD extend beyond concerns about the
embryo itself .

4. The HLA Tissue-Typed Embryo

Through PGD, human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing
strategies can characterise the post-PGD embryo according to whether
the tissue-type of the child the embryo might become, will be an
appropriate match for stem cell donation to a living sick sibling.300
HLA tissue typing or preimplantation tissue

typing

(PTT)301 uses

PGD for 'third party benefit' 302 by allowing the woman undergoing
IVF and her family to 'ensure that their next child will have identical
HLA proteins '303 so that its stem cells can be 'transplanted into the

affected sibling' .304
The use of HLA tissue typing has been confined to siblings in all
jurisdictions that have produced relevant regulations or guidelines.305
In Canada where no guidelines or regulations yet exist,

the

policy document on PGD refers to the 'existing child', the
child' and the 'saviour sibling phenomenon' ,306 and the
World report refers to 'a seriously ill sibling' .307 The

recent
'affected

Brave

New

HFEA's

2004

policy on tissue typing, which expanded the application of tissue
typing, did not conclusively rule out its use for a genetic

parent's

benefit, suggesting it needed 'further consideration' .308 The policy
approved tissue typing 'subject to appropriate safeguards', where 'a
genuine need for potentially life-saving tissue' exists for an 'affected
child' .309 The 2005 review of the HFE Act in the UK rejected this
position and concluded that, 'there are no compelling reasons for a
statutory authority to make judgements on whether or not a family
can seek preimplantation tissue typing, provided they fall within
the parameters set out by Parliament', and explicitly contemplates
the possibility of 'saviour sons and daughters, or even nephews
and nieces' .310 However, the HFE Bill currently under consideration
would amend the HFE Act to limit PTT to a sibling suffering from
a 'serious medical condition' .311
In the case of PTT, embryos found to be a 'match' for a sick
sibling would be deemed suitable for transfer to the woman . Embryos
found not to be a match would therefore be deemed 'unsuitable'
for implantation to the woman undergoing IVF. As the notion of 'third-

party benefit' 312 makes clear, suitability in this case would be determined
not by the well-being of a potential future child, but by their potential
to produce stem cells to treat an existing sibling with a disease or
condition. Canada's Brave New World Report describes the benefit of
tissue typing as 'making it possible to select for and transfer only those
in vitro embryos that have certain traits needed' for donation to the
living sibling.313 The report uses the term 'donor child' to characterise
the future child produced through this process of selection .314
This

description

challenges

the

often-invoked

'seriousness'

justifications for the use of PGD and this inconsistency is dealt with
differently in the jurisdictions we examined . In New Zealand the
embryo to be tested must itself be at risk for an inherited genetic
condition for which PGD is already applied, thus making PGD for
PTT an 'add-on' procedure. 315 In contrast PGD can be applied with
'the sole treatment objective' for the
match in the UK.

316

purpose of

finding

a

tissue

The HFEA tissue typing policy has moved from

a 'restrictive' application of PGD for the purpose of finding a tissue
match only where the use of PGD was justified by the embryo 'at
risk from the condition by which the existing child is affected' ,317
to a new 'extended' policy in which there is no distinction

made

between 'inherited and sporadic diseases' .318
Two cases from the UK illustrate the complexity of regulating
PGD for PTT. 319 The situation of the Hashmi family became the basis
for R (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority

320

a case which sought judicial review of the

HFEA's approval of a licence for PTT.321 The Hashmi's fell under the
accepted applications of the tissue typing 2001 UK policy however,
the case was based on a third-party challenge to the authority of the
HFEA to licence for the use of PGD for the purposes of PTT.322 Zain
Hashmi, the fourth child in a family of five, had a blood condition
called beta thalassaernia major which could be cured with a stem cell
transplant from someone with matching tissue, likely a sibling. None
of the existing children were a match; and while Mrs. Hashmi got
pregnant twice in hopes of producing a match she chose to terminate
one pregnancy after the prenatal testing showed the child would have
the same blood condition, and the next child was not a tissue match
for Zain. The Hashrnis, through a physician, applied to the HFEA
to undergo IVF treatment and use PGD to find a tissue match. The
license was granted, however one attempt produced only one tissue
match which was also 'affected' by the same condition, and while
a second produced two 'unaffected' tissue matches, neither of these
successfully implanted in Mrs. Hashmi.323
The court challenge was appealed to the House of Lords which
held that PTT was an activity within the provision of IVF for which
the HFEA was authorised to grant a licence, under paragraph 1(1)(d)
of Schedule 2 of the Act: 'practices designed to secure that embryos
are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman or to determine
whether embryos are suitable for that purpose' .324 By interpreting
'suitable' in a purposive manner, the court granted the HFEA broad
powers to judge what was ethically acceptable,

which included

an acceptance of 'the purposes of the mother' as included under
'suitability'.325 This logically opens the door to the HFEA authorising
the use of PGD for social selection, however the court determined
that it would be the responsibility of Parliament to step in if this
were to occur. 326
Charlie Whitaker was born with Diamond Blackfan syndrome,
which is a rare form of anaemia that can be cured by stem cells
from a tissue match. Neither of his parents are carriers, and his sister
was not a tissue match. The family went to an ART centre, which
applied for a licence to the HFEA to perform PGD for the purposes
of finding a tissue match for Charlie. In this case the HFEA rejected
the application under the 2001 policy because the condition of the
existing child was not an inherited condition; therefore, it is highly
unlikely that the embryos the Whitakers would produce through IVF
would be 'affected', and directly 'benefit'

327

from undergoing PGD.

The Whitakers chose to travel to the US to undergo the procedure
and a successful tissue match was produced. 328 While the story of
the Whitaker family provides important context for understanding
the UK's shift to a more expansive policy, the House of Lords'
conclusions in Quintavalle help to explain the recent push

to have

more legally defined parameters about the use of PGD in the UK.
In her submissions to the SCT, the Chair of the HFEA suggested
that 'she would like to see permitted purposes of PGD set out in
legislation in a similar way to research' ,329 to avoid the dilemmas
involved in dealing with PGD. Clearly the HFEA's reliance on 'a

significant risk of a serious
the embryo'

330

genetic

condition

being

present

in

as the basis for limiting the application of PGD is

complicated by both the broad authority they were found to have
by the House of Lords and the court's purposive
of suitability. The

SCT did recommend

reducing

interpretation
the

'freedom'

of the HFEA granted by the current HFE Act in order to ensure
that 'Parliament is able to revisit contentious issues relating to the
creation of new life and the permissible uses of human embryos' .331
The Government's response to the review agreed 'that it would be
preferable if the parameters for PGD were more clearly set out

in

law' .332 The HFE Bill would provide explicit parameters, codifying
acceptable purposes for the HFEA's approval of licenses for embryo
testing, including PTI.333
The New Zealand policy on HLA tissue typing restricts PGD
for PTT to situations where there are 'therapeutic indications for the
embryo to justify embryo biopsy' .334 It permits tissue typing where
both the 'affected child' and the embryo are at risk of being affected
by a 'familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked disorder'
and restricts the 'planned treatment' to the use of 'only

the cord

blood of the future sibling' .335 The HGRP has pointed out that the
potentially unintended consequence of

New

Zealand's

approach

is

that even where PGD would be 'clinically indicated' for the embryo,
if the sibling is not suffering from a 'genetic' condition, but requires
stem cell transplantation for another condition, PGD would not be
authorised. Further, if the sibling did have a genetic disorder but the

embryo was not at risk of inheriting that particular

condition, PGD

could still be performed 336 as long as the embryo could be affected
by a 'familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked disorder
for which a PGD test is available' .337 In this case the HLA tissue
typing is seen as an 'add on' justified by 'medical indication'

for

embryo biopsy. 338
The concept of restricting PGD for PTT so that the 'embryo may
benefit' (as described in the Whitaker case) or to situations where
a 'therapeutic indication' for the embryo exists,339 or to which the
embryo may receive a 'clinical benefit' 340 raises a series of problems.
First, it presupposes that an embryo can have a 'therapeutic indication'
to, or 'clinical benefit' from its being biopsied, or from a therapeutic
intervention that could occur to the embryo based on the results of
the biopsy (or even to the fetus through, for example, fetal surgery).
Embryo therapy currently does not exist, although it may in the future,
as fetal surgery is now being performed for anomalies such as those
related to the cardiovascular 341 and neuro/skeletal systems.342 Rather,
the 'therapeutic indication' or 'clinical benefit' that is implied in cases
where PGD has been approved for the embryos at risk of having a
genetic condition is the destruction of the embryo: the antithesis of
both a 'therapeutic indication' and a 'clinical benefit'. In our opinion
the therapeutic indication is for the child that is already born and
who will die without stem cell transplantation. It is for this child that
a woman is willing to go through the risks of IVF medication and
surgery. We believe that it is compassionate as well as logical

'to

justify embryo biopsy' on the basis of its 'benefit' to a child rather
than to the destruction of an embryo.
One of the most common concerns raised in relation to tissue
typing is that 'children are being 'designed' to meet the needs of an
existing person' .343 'Objectification' or 'commodification' arguments344
pointed out in some commentaries

345

can be problematised by

arguments about the diversity and complexity of motivations behind
the choice to have children in all situations .346 As the STC in the UK
pointed out, some people may object to PGD for PTT 'in principle',
but others differentiate where 'the child born as a result of the test
was at risk of developing the condition' .347 Such differentiations rest
on the notion that the embryo should 'benefit from the process' 348
to balance out concerns about the 'safety of the biopsy process' 349
and the dilemma of children being born 'solely as a means to an
end' .350
In their most recent policy the HFEA revisited the

issue

safety and

took the view that the risk to the resulting child associated with embryo
biopsy is not enough to warrant a policy which distinguishes between
cases in which preimplantation tissue typing is used in combination
with PGD for serious disease and where discovering tissue type is
the sole treatment objective. However, the latest evidence should be
considered in relation to each application. 351

of

Health Canada's issues paper on PGD cites undue exposure of
an embryo to the 'potential health risks of PGD' as a concern where
'there is no risk to inherit a genetic condition' .352 The paper points
out that 'whatever the potential benefits of PGD-HLA, they must also
counterbalance the fact that in vitro embryos that would otherwise be
fit for transfer may not be used for reproductive purposes'. 353
Another related set of concerns has emerged about the 'welfare'
of a child born as a 'saviour sibling', particularly in relation to the
impact on family relationships 354 and 'psychological' effects.355 The
submissions of the British Medical Association to the STC Review
cited concerns about 'psychological harm' 356 and the Royal College
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists noted that '[t]his area is too new
for the full effects to be known on the child conceived' .357 The HFEA
policy notes that there are also concerns as to the 'welfare of the
mother undergoing IVF at an already stressful time' .358 However, while
the HFEA cautioned that 'these issues be carefully and sensitively
addressed ',359 they concluded that there was 'no evidence ...that
adverse psychological effects would result from the procedure' .360
The STC's response to the concerns about tissue typing, in line with
their general preference for minimal regulatory intervention discussed
above, characterises these issues as 'matters for doctors to explain
clearly in advance and not for regulation or legislation' .361 The ITA
in Victoria leaves the decision of the application of PGD for PTT
to 'Ethics Committee at the institution where the procedure is being
undertaken' on a 'case by case basis' ,362 however they do direct them

to consider impacts on the future child such as the potential failure
of treatment for the living sibling.363

5. The Post-PGD Carrier Embryo

Beyond identifying embryos that

are themselves

'affected'

by a genetic condition, PGD can also identify embryos which are
'carriers'364 of genes for autosomal 'recessive disorders' .365 The person
into which a carrier embryo may develop does not develop the genetic
'condition', as it possesses only one of the two genes366 required to
express the phenotype (characteristics) of the condition . Although the
person the embryo can become will not exhibit the condition, if this
person becomes a biological parent with a person who

'carries' a

gene for the same 'recessive' condition, their child has a 25% chance
of expressing this condition and a 50% chance of being a carrier,
based on Mendelian genetics .367 The post-PGD embryo, thus could
become a person who could pass on the condition to their children,368
but who is unaffected by the gene themselves.
The status of the carrier embryo is unclear in most jurisdictions
as there is considerable controversy about the ethics of not implanting
such 'healthy' embryos where the reason to not implant them is based
on the very small possibility that, if the embryo becomes an adult who
has a child with another individual who carries the recessive gene,
the child could have the condition.369 In support of not

implanting

carrier embryos, it has been suggested that women 'may wish to
ensure that their future children will not have to experience the same
difficulties' 370 in making reproductive choices about genetic disorders,
and should therefore be able to 'choose not to replace carrier embryos
as part of their treatment' .371 In the UK, such a decision 'rests with
the patient in consultation with the clinical team' .372
In the

case of a carrier embryo, 'health' or 'suitability' for

reproductive use is defined in relation to the potential children of
the potential future person that would result from an embryo's
implantation in the woman. In Australia, this kind of multigenerational
selection against genetic conditions appears to be incompatible with
the national guidelines on PGD.373 Although there is no national
regulation in Australia specifically addressing the post-PGD carrier
embryo, the NHMRC's guidelines specifically state that '[p]ending
further community discussion ... PGD must not be used for prevention
of conditions that do not seriously harm the person to be born' .374
Therefore in the case of an embryo carrying a gene that does not
in itself express a 'serious' condition, as is the case for autosomal
recessive genes, the NHMRC
carrier embryos should

be

guidelines

indicate

that post-PGD

implanted.375 Victoria's

ITA guidelines

specify that testing and selection for carrier status would be approved
on a case-by-case

basis;376 however,

interestingly

the guidelines

differentiate between carriers for sex-linked disorders for which there
is no approval from the Authority required, and carriers of autosomal
recessive disorder where 'the future child's risk of transmitting

a

genetic abnormality is much lower than with x-linked conditions' for
which approval of the Authority is required. 377
The decision to transfer carrier embryos to the woman will likely
be affected by the number of embryos that are deemed 'suitable for
transfer' through PGD.378 In the UK, the HGC's

response

to

the

HFEA consultation on PGD in 2000 suggested ' ...if it was possible
to exclude affected embryos without discovering the carrier status
of others without compromising the

accuracy

of

the

test,

then

this is to be preferred' .379 They cited both the 'increased chance
of an unaffected pregnancy' and protection of 'the unborn child's
subsequent right to decide for themselves whether or not to be tested
for their carrier status'

380

as the basis for this recommendation.

The

latter is consistent with the overall respect for individual reproductive
autonomy in the UK, however autonomy could also be the basis for
arguments that '...people should generally be given a choice to use
artificial reproductive technologies as they feel appropriate as long as
it does not harm that child' .381
Another

justification for

selecting against carriers

is

the

'obligation . . .to have the best possible child' both in terms of that
individual child's 'health' and the concern 'that the child should
not burden future generations in terms of health and social care' .382
The subjective assessment of what is to be considered 'best',

what

'health' means, and what should be considered a 'burden' on society
are avoided by a reliance on assumptions of health and normalcy as
the absence of disability and/or a genetic condition

which,

in our

view, should not be the case.383 This kind of argument ultimately
undermines justifications for the use of PGD based on its limitation
to 'serious' conditions, and 'objective' criteria.384
Interestingly, the HGC reversed its cautious position on carrier
embryos in the 2006 Making Babies report. They state that '...in
situations where PGD is being used, and where there are both carrier
and unaffected embryos of equal quality, parents should be able to
request which they prefer to

be implanted' .385 Their report cites the

position of the British Medical Association .386 While noting concerns
about the unreasonableness of rejecting an embryo 'predicted to be
healthy', they accept that '[i]n practice ...there may be a hierarchy of
preference in which unaffected embryos that look healthy are scored
higher than embryos that are carriers or look less likely to implant
successfully' .387 As the pregnancy rate following

PGD

is

already

lower than the thirteen percent pregnancy rate generally accepted for
IVF,388 it would be clinically appropriate to cryopreserve (and transfer
to the woman at a later time) post-PGD carrier embryos, if there
are more embryos than the one or two that can be safely implanted
following an IVF treatment cycle,389 in order that the woman need
not risk harms of additional IVF cycles.39° Carrier embryos may be
seen currently as occupying an uncertain position between 'suitable'
and 'unsuitable' depending on the supply of in vitro embryos for
research. This uncertain position excludes 'healthy' embryos with
particular genetic characteristics that have no consequences for the
potential child itself from reproductive use.

The HGRP report states that while, '[t]esting for carrier status'
is not covered by the current guidelines in New Zealand,391 'some
families are using PGD to select against carrier embryos'.392 In the
absence of regulatory direction, selection against

carrier

embryos

appears to be increasingly accepted in New Zealand without public
debate or discussion.
Canada's AHR Act does not specify what the status of carrier
embryos identified by PGD would be. Although it was not clear in
any of the Canadian documents examined, arguably it is likely that
carrier embryos deemed unsuitable for transfer on the basis of genetic
characteristics would be characterised the same way as an 'affected'
embryo, and would therefore be subject to the applicable consent and
donation process for use in research or training.
In the appendix to Australia's NHMRC 2004 Guidelines, which
are currently under review, one of the listed 'reasons for opposing
or limiting the use of genetic technologies associated with ART' is
that '[o]therwise normal (so-called 'carrier') embryos that would be
expected to have a normal life will be discarded' .393 In addition, our
study suggests that selection against carrier embryos is problematic
because of the potential for genetic carriers to be deemed incompatible
with reproductive use, once again raising questions noted above about
how this may change social and medical attitudes and practices, and
what kind of implications this would have for people living with
disabilities, and their families.394

IV.CONCLUSION

Our

analysis suggests a

mutually constructive relationship

between characterisations of the post-PGD embryo and the expanding
purposes for which PGD is applied, as well as the uses to which
embryos are ultimately relegated. The language of characterisation
exposed above, through which post-PGD embryos are deemed to
be 'unaffected' or 'affected', to be 'carriers', or are selected on the
basis of sex or an HLA tissue match, all raise important social and
ethical questions that must be examined as the regulation of ART
develops internationally. Driven by imperatives such as reproductive
autonomy, the desire for children of particular characteristics, 'disease'
prevention, and sources of embryos, particularly 'fresh' embryos, for
research purposes, clinicians, patients, researchers and policy makers
are circumventing debates about the social dimensions of using PGD
for a growing number of genetic indications. The consequences of
this lack of social concern could be profound for people living with
genetic conditions, other disabilities, their families and broader society.
Subtle shifts in language and terminology about what it means for
an embryo to be 'healthy', or compatible with reproductive use, can
have long-term consequences on broad social norms and values; and,
as discussed above, far from being neutral, such determinations point
to the ongoing medicalisation of disability and women's reproductive
choices. Assumptions about the meaning of health, normalcy and

reproductive choice must be exposed and examined to ensure that
new technologies and practices benefit all members of society, and
that reproductive health policy is developed with a broad spectrum of
perspectives and experiences in mind.
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Human Fertilisation and Embryolog y Bill
Department of Health, Human Tissues and
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Legislation Review: Prohibition of
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IT Act
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Victoria Infertility Treatment Act 1995
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